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Abstract: 
With interest rates stuck near zero for the foreseeable future, the Federal Reserve has 
had to employ numerous unconventional monetary policy measures in an attempt to 
stimulate an economy in the after math of the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression. I assess the usefulness of market-based measures of expectations in gauging 
the effects of these seemingly extreme policy actions undertaken in an environment of 
unprecedented fear and uncertainty. I use a principal component analysis to combine a 
number of asset prices that indicate different types of market expectations; by combining 
these variables into one single variable indicator, this principal component variable 
filters out the variance among these similar variables and focuses on the common 
movements among the variables that can be attributed to a specific market force such as 
investors’ inflation expectations, overall market risk appetite, and economic growth 
expectations.
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1. Introduction 
When the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered its target federal 
funds rate to a range of 0 to 25, the Fed was left with no room for further conventional 
monetary policy easing at a time when they desperately needed to stimulate borrowing 
and consumption in an attempt to avoid severe economic contraction. With the federal 
funds rate stuck at this zero-lower-bound, the Federal Reserve has had to employ 
unconventional monetary policies in an attempt to facilitate economic growth and 
recovery in the wake of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. These 
unconventional policies have been the subject of much debate among politicians and 
market participants. 
A number of economists have conducted studies on the effects of these 
unconventional easing policies on different assets, overall market conditions, and the 
pace of economic recovery in the U.S. Many believe quantitative easing had the effect of 
inflating asset prices across markets and affected the value of securities through a few 
channels—future policy expectations, a portfolio rebalancing effect, and improving 
market functionality during a period of chaos and uncertainty, which effectively reduced 
risk premiums across a variety of markets. Critics of quantitative easing claim that by 
removing supply of certain long-term assets, the Fed simply manipulated the equilibrium 
risk premia to reduce longer-term rates in order to boost consumption and investment.  
However, some suggest this was a market distortion that led to artificial inflation of asset 
prices without stimulating the overall economy. Other critics point to the unemployment 
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rate that remained elevated and US GDP growth that remained slower than anticipated. 
Still others claim that quantitative easing was a temporary solution and did not have any 
lasting effects on the US economy. 
I chose to expand on a few of these studies in order to better evaluate the spillover 
effect of these unconventional policies on assets other than the assets that the Fed was 
directly purchasing. I looked at numerous asset prices across different securities markets 
and used a principal components analysis in an attempt to find a better variable indicator 
of investors’ inflation expectations, economic growth expectations, and market risk 
appetite. Using this type of analysis, I was looking for the best combination of high-
frequency variables that would result in an improved ability to measure the implications 
of unconventional monetary policy. For example, there are many different types of 
variables that indicate investors’ inflation expectations—TIPS breakevens, inflation 
swaps, and even certain commodity prices such as gold and oil. Though some of these 
assets are highly correlated in their responses to quantitative easing and other monetary 
policy actions, they don’t react identically. By accounting for some of the variability 
across these individual assets that indicate similar expectations or market conditions, a 
principal component variable can be used to find the best combination of variables to 
predict the effects of future monetary policy and to measure the effects of past 
unconventional policy.  
 
2. Literature Review: 
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Numerous articles have been written in an attempt to assess the impact of U.S. 
government policy responses to the US financial crisis. Most of these articles assess the 
impact of monetary or fiscal stimulus in the wake of the financial crisis; a few others 
propose ideas for the next step US policymakers should take in their struggle to stimulate 
a stagnant and sluggish economic recovery from what most now call the worst downturn 
since the great depression. 
Traditional monetary policy in the US consists of the Federal Reserve setting the 
target Federal Funds rate that determines the interest rate at which banks will loan to each 
other on an overnight basis. However, as a result of the financial crisis, this key short-
term interest rate has been stuck at nearly zero since December 2008. Most 
macroeconomists reason that because the “U.S. currency carries an interest rate of zero, it 
is virtually impossible for the FOMC to target a value for the federal funds rate that is 
substantially below zero.” (Swanson, 2001) Faced with a zero lower bound, 
policymakers have had to come up with alternative ways to ease monetary policy given 
the stagnant rate of recovery the US economy currently faces. Prior to the financial crisis, 
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) wrote an article discussing potential monetary 
policy options when the Federal Funds rate reaches this zero-lower-bound, and found 
three options they believed would be effective: 1) communication from the Fed to shape 
public expectations for future policy and the future level of interest rates, 2) increasing 
the size of the Fed’s balance sheet through “quantitative easing”, and 3) changing the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet by selling shorter-dated securities and 
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buying longer-term securities. Since 2008, the Federal Reserve has employed all three of 
these strategies. 
Over the past few years, a number of empirical studies have been conducted to 
assess the impact of these unconventional policies, and economists have reached a 
variety of conclusions. In this study, I aim to expand on the findings of a few researchers 
by focusing specifically on announcements and actions relating to quantitative easing 
policies a principal components analysis and an event-study technique. Annette Vissing-
Jorgensen and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2011) use an event-study technique to evaluate the 
effects of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve on different types of risk 
premiums. They begin with the hypothesis that quantitative easing policies can 
potentially reduce long-term interest rates through seven channels: duration risk 
premium, liquidity premium, safety premium, prepayment risk premium, default risk 
premium, inflation risk premium, and a signaling channel.  Using daily and intra-day 
data, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen conduct an event-study to evaluate through 
which of these channels quantitative easing had the most significant impact on the level 
of longer-term nominal rates. They conclude that the most significant driver of the 
reduction in long-term rates was through the safety premium channel, as rate declines 
were most significant on long-term safe assets such as U.S. Treasuries, Agency debt, and 
highly rated corporate bonds. They also conclude that the Fed’s large-scale asset 
purchases had a significant impact on agency MBS yields only when direct purchases of 
agency MBS securities occurred. This led them to believe that quantitative easing 
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involving agency MBS purchases reduces the equilibrium prepayment risk premium 
specific to mortgage-related securities, but that quantitative easing involving only U.S. 
Treasury securities did not have a significant impact on prepayment risk premium in the 
current low-for-long rate environment. .  Finally, they conclude that quantitative easing 
raised investors’ inflation expectations and the overall level of inflation, as reflected in 
TIPS breakeven yields and inflation swap rates on the key dates of their event study. 
However, it is important to note that during the second round of quantitative easing, 
Vissing-Jorgenson and Krishnamurthy find that measures of inflation expectations 
derived from TIPS versus inflation expectations derived from inflation swaps deviate 
from each other and display some marked differences; they conclude that “while inflation 
swaps and TIPS both point to a rise in inflation expectations, there is a dramatic 
difference in the numbers from each asset market.” Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen do not address this further, but instead simply assert they are unsure as to why 
this happens. One way in which this could happen is if the TIPS and inflation swaps 
markets attract different types of clients, and these different clients hold different 
inflation expectations and have divergent concerns about the magnitude and direction of 
inflation risk. With this in mind, I thought a principal component analysis using different 
types of inflation indicators would be an interesting and potentially more reliable way to 
gauge the impact of monetary policy on inflation expectations going forward.  
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010) reach a similar conclusion as 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen and find a significant reduction in the safety 
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premium due to quantitative easing; they attribute this to a “portfolio balance” effect. By 
purchasing a specified amount of an asset, the Fed reduces the amount of this asset held 
by the private sector; for this to occur, investors must reduce their holding of the asset. 
For investors to be willing to make this adjustment, the yield on the security must fall, 
which thereby raises its price. However, unlike Vissing-Jorgensen and Krishnamurthy, 
Gagnon et al. found this portfolio balance effect spilled over into other assets insofar as 
they were close enough substitutes for the securities the Fed was purchasing. For 
example, they found that as yields on US Treasuries fell, investors are likely to bid up the 
prices of other assets such as Agency debt and highly rated corporate bonds, and even 
equities in a search for potential yield.  With these results in mind, I reasoned that, 
similar to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen’s findings that inflation-indicating 
securities show divergent inflation expectations, there are likely similar divergences 
among assets that indicate growth expectations or overall market risk appetite. Therefore, 
a principal component analysis could also be used to find reliable variable indicators for 
risk appetite as well as economic growth. 
Vayanos and Vila (2009) also assess the effectiveness of unconventional 
monetary policy in a zero rate environment. They find the same portfolio balancing effect 
but offer further explanation of why exactly it occurs. Vayanos and Vila assume the 
existence of two types of investors: one group, the “preferred-habit” investors, who have 
specific bond maturity and risk preference and are willing to pay despite increased prices, 
and the arbitrageurs who are willing to hold any asset depending on its risk and expected 
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return profile. They conclude that because of the existence of this second group, the Fed 
has the potential to flatten the yield curve by buying longer-securities and selling shorter-
dated securities such as short-term treasuries or bank reserves, but not to significantly 
reduce the overall level of interest rates using a quantitative easing policy. This is 
consistent with other economists who conclude that once short-term rates reach zero, 
they cannot be reduced further because the yield on U.S. currency is effectively zero. 
By conducting a principal component analysis of different types of market 
indicators—inflation expectations, growth expectations, and overall market risk—I am 
looking to expand Vayanos and Villa's conception of segmented markets, Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen’s inflation expectations results, as well as Gagnon, Raskin, 
Remache, and Sack’s conclusion that the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy resulted 
in spillover effects of price inflation across markets. 
 
3. Methodology 
 When looking at historical data prices across markets, the options for inflation 
indicators, economic growth indicators, and market risk indicators are vast. To account 
for the variation among these different inflation indicators, market risk indicators, and 
economic growth indicators, I used a principal component analysis. A principal 
component analysis is a mathematical procedure used to reduce the number of similar 
variables in order to develop a smaller number of artificial variables; these artificial 
variables are called principal components. This variable-reduction procedure is similar to 
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factor-analysis and is used when a number of observed variables indicate a similar result, 
but with some variation. I looked at a number of asset price variables, and categorized the 
securities into three types of market indicators: inflation expectations, market risk, and 
economic growth.  
 After finding these principal component variables, I put the results on a graphical 
timeline and focused on three questions; first, were there any noticeably large price or 
yield movements that coincided with macroeconomic and policy events, such as the 
Lehman Brother collapse or the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing announcements? 
Second, were these large movements consistent with macroeconomic theory 
expectations? For example, did inflation expectations rise on the days that the Fed 
announced quantitative easing policies? And finally, in cases where similar individual 
variable indicators (for example, TIPS breakevens and inflation swaps) diverge from 
each other, does the principal component variable show more consistency with 
macroeconomic theory expectations?  
 
4. Data 
Most of the security price data was accumulated from Bloomberg and from J.P. 
Morgan’s research database, MorganMarkets. In order to be able to compare different 
types of securities (for example some were measured in spreads to US Treasuries, while 
others were simply dollar prices), I normalized the price and spread data, as well as the 
principal component variable, to 100.  I then categorized the securities into three types of 
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indicators: 1) inflation indications, 2) market risk indicators, and 3) economic growth 
indicators. 
 
a. Inflation Indicators 
To gauge the impact of unconventional monetary policy on investors’ inflation 
expectations, I looked at the five-year TIPS breakeven yield, one-year inflation swap 
rate, five-year inflation swap rate, and commodities prices. 
 
 
i. Five-year TIPS Breakeven Yield 
The TIPS breakeven yield measures the difference in yield between Treasury 
Inflation Protected Securities and nominal Treasury yields of the same maturity. An 
increase in the breakeven rate is often viewed as a sign of rising inflation expectations in 
the market. Although the U.S. Treasury issues 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year TIPS, I opted 
for the 5-year TIPS breakeven yield as these most closely mirror investors’ short- and 
medium-term inflation expectations which most were affected most significantly by 
unconventional monetary policy. 
ii. Inflation Swaps (one-year, five-year) 
Two cash flows are exchanged at the end of a given period of time; one party pays 
the expected inflation rate that is determined the day of the swap agreement (the fixed 
cash flow) while the other party pays the actual inflation rate that is realized over the 
specific period of time. Generally, inflation swap rates rise as investors’ inflation 
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expectations rise. I chose to look at the one-year inflation swap rate as an indicator of 
investors’ inflation expectations in the short-term, and the five-year inflation swap rate as 
reflective of their medium-term expectations.  
iii. Commodities Prices—Oil, Gold, Cotton 
Commodity prices often reflect inflation expectations far more quickly than 
consumer prices indicate, as consumer prices exhibit a time lag in response to inflation. 
Frank Browne and David Cronin (2007) conducted a study on the relationship between 
commodity prices and the expansion of the monetary base and found that commodity 
prices and consumer prices are both proportional to the monetary supply over the long-
term, but that commodity prices often overshoot their new equilibrium values in response 
to an expansion of the monetary base. For this reason, I thought commodity prices would 
be a good measure of investors’ inflation expectations due to significant macroeconomic 
or policy events, as the changes may be exaggerated relative to CPI changes. Also, 
commodity prices can be recorded on a daily and intra-day basis, where as the CPI is 
reported only quarterly. However, one caveat to using commodity prices to evaluate 
changes in inflation expectations is that commodity prices are affected by a number of 
other market factors. For example, gold became a main flight-to-quality investment from 
late-April until September 2011; gold prices rose sharply due to the escalation of the 
sovereign debt crisis and the debt ceiling crisis in the US. Similarly, oil prices are often 
linked to investors’ economic growth projections; they will invest in oil futures in times 
of projected economic growth, and the price of oil will fall as economic growth, as 
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indicated by production and consumption, is expected to fall. 
b. Economic Growth Indicators 
To measure the impact of monetary policy events on investors’ economic growth 
expectations, I looked at a few types of assets: stock market indices such as the S&P 500 
and Dow Jones Industrial Average, dividend swap indices, and a commercial mortgage-
backed securities index. 
i. Dow Jones Industrial Average 
The DJIA is a price-weighted index of 30 major publically held U.S. companies. 
The performance of the index overall reflects conditions in the economy as a whole and 
is frequently bought and sold by investors to increase their exposure to equities (a riskier 
investment) without taking on individual firm-specific risk by investing in an individual 
corporation. 
ii. S&P 500  
The S&P 500 is a market value weighted index of 500 stock prices of the largest 
publically held U.S. companies. Like the Dow, the performance of the S&P 500 can be 
used to gauge conditions in the overall market, as well as investors’ future expectations 
for economic growth. It is an extremely liquid index and therefore it is traded frequently 
and often on a short-term, speculative basis. 
iii. S&P 500 Dividend Swap Index, 2012 and 2014  
Two cash flows are exchanged at the end of a given period of time: one party, the 
buyer, agrees to pay a future fixed cash amount based on S&P dividend expectations, 
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while the other party, the seller, agrees to pay the actual dividends realized after the 
specified time period. Investors use dividend swaps to express their views on 
consumption growth, a main driver of GDP growth in the U.S. They will pay the fixed 
cash amount if they expect the economy to expand and dividends to increase with 
economic growth. 
iv. CMBX Index—CMBX Series 3, AM tranche   
The CMBX indices are synthetic, tradable indices that reference a specific  
group of 25 commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). The CMBS market often 
moves in tandem with investors’ growth expectations, as the market for commercial real 
estate is expected to grow during periods of overall economic growth. I chose the third 
series and AM tranche because the CMBX AM 3 tends to be fairly volatile; the holders of 
the underlying AM bonds are likely to receive payments in times of economic growth, 
but unlikely to receive payments should the economy contract and companies default on 
their commercial real-estate payments. Tranches such as the AAA are less volatile as 
payments are more stable and less contingent on economic conditions, while tranches 
such as BBB and below are less volatile for the opposite reason that repayment is highly 
unlikely regardless of overall economic conditions. 
c. Market Risk Indicators  
i. Agency Debt Spread to Treasuries  
Agency and Treasury securities of the same maturity have very similar risk 
characteristics – they have the same minimal risk of default, inflation risk, and maturity 
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risk. However, they differ in their liquidity premium, as Treasury securities are far more 
liquid than agency debt. Agency-Treasury spread widening often reflects investor flight-
to-quality, which results from increased market risk. 
ii. Credit Default Swap Indices (CDX.NA.HY, CDX.NA.IG) 
A credit default swap can be thought of as an insurance policy on any financial 
asset. The seller of the CDS agrees to compensate the buyer in the event that a payment 
obligation on a debt security (such as a corporate bond or loan) fails to be paid by the 
entity that issues the debt. However, there is a significant difference between a traditional 
insurance policy and a credit default swap in that the buyer of CDS protection does not 
have to own the asset it believes will default. The price of a credit default swap rises as 
the credit risk of the underlying asset derivative rises; therefore, credit default swaps can 
be used as a measure of the credit risk of a financial asset. I used two credit default swap 
indices, one that reflects a number of high-yield bonds (CDX.NA.HY) and another for 
investment grade bonds (CDX.NA.IG), to gauge the impact of monetary policy and other 
significant macroeconomic events on default risk premium. 
iii. Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX)  
The VIX is a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P option prices; it 
essentially acts as an indicator of investors’ near-term volatility expectations. The VIX 
tends to rise as a result of increased investor uncertainty and is known to move with 
positive or negative news headlines.  
iv. J.P. Morgan US Liquid Index (JULI), 1-3 years, AAA and BBB tranches  
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The J,P. Morgan US Liquid Index (JULI) encompasses high-grade fixed-rate 
corporate bonds into a measurable index. Like the bonds themselves, these indices have 
different tranches depending on the credit risk of the investment. I will use the AAA and 
BBB tranche, both investment grade but at opposite ends of the risk spectrum, to measure 
different levels of credit risk, and will look at the spread to U.S. Treasuries of the same 
maturity in an attempt to isolate a default risk premium. This default risk premium is 
reflected by the difference between yields on Treasuries and on these corporate bonds.  
v. Agency MBS Spread to U.S. Treasuries, FNMA 4.5 and FNMA 5.0  
This metric is more complicated, as there is no perfect way to measure the exact 
return that an agency mortgage-backed security will generate; its realized yield depends 
on borrower defaults and prepayments, which depends on the overall level of rates, the 
housing market, and economic conditions in general. There are many ways to quantify 
the predicted yield of an agency MBS security; the simplest way being its static 
(estimated) yield spread over a single point on the Treasury curve, determined by the 
MBS bond’s estimated duration. This static MBS-Treasury spread reflects the estimated 
prepayment and default risk, and therefore reinvestment risk associated with an agency 
MBS security. The difference in the estimated MBS yield and its interpolated US 
Treasury yield reflects the prepayment risk premium as well as liquidity risk premium 
associated with an agency MBS bond. 
5. Important Macroeconomic or Policy Event Dates 
ii. September 15, 2008: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
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On September 15, 2008, after days of merger talks and attempts to sell the 
company, Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. To date, it is the 
largest bankruptcy filing in US history, with Lehman holding over $600 billion in assets. 
Because of Lehman’s significant involvement in the commercial paper market, the 
commercial paper market effectively froze, and turmoil quickly spread to other private 
credit markets. 
i. November 25, 2008: First QE1 announcement 
In the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy, and with other major US corporations 
such as AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac proving insolvent, the Fed announced its first 
round of its quantitative easing (QE1) on November 25, 2008, amidst rising uncertainty 
and fear in the US economy. Quantitative easing would consist of purchases of up to 
$100 billion of agency debt and up to $500 billion of agency MBS. In their press release, 
the Federal Reserve announced that it initiated the program because of the excessive 
spread widening in credit markets. With this unconventional monetary policy, the Fed 
intended to reduce the cost of mortgage financing and increase the availability of credit 
for the purchase of homes. The committee believed that reducing the cost of mortgages 
would facilitate a recovery in the housing market, which would improve conditions 
across financial markets in general. 
 iii. December 16, 2008: Target Fed Funds Rate hits 0 
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In its last attempt at conventional monetary policy, the Fed lowers its target 
Federal Funds rate to 0–25 basis points, where it remains today and is expected to remain 
for the foreseeable future. 
 iv. January 5, 2009: First quantitative easing purchases by the Fed 
v. March 18, 2009: Fed increases QE1 purhcases 
The Fed announces additional purchases of up to $750 billion agency MBS as 
well as up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities (2-10 year maturities) with 
the intention of stimulating private borrowing by improving conditions in private credit 
markets. The committee saw a lackluster pace of recovery with the economy continuing 
to contract: job losses continued at a steady pace, tight credit conditions remained, and 
business investment, equity value, and consumer wealth continued to decline. The 
FOMC believed an expansion of QE1 would provide greater support to mortgage lending 
and housing markets. 
vi. March 25, 2009: First US Treasuries purchased under QE1 
vii. May 27, 2009: Significant selloff in long-term rates and MBS yields 
Hancock and Passmore (2011) note the importance of May 27, 2009 in their 
analysis of the effect the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchase program on a variety of 
mortgage rates. They found that mortgage rates increased an average of 38 basis points 
during the week of May 27, 2009 in tandem with a significant rise in agency MBS yields. 
The researchers believe that an increase in longer-term Treasury yields combined with 
expectations of higher long-term yields in the future caused agency MBS investors to sell 
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in large quantities. These higher rates prompted holders of higher-coupon MBS to sell 
their holdings and lock in capital gains created by the decline in yields caused by QE1. 
Hancock and Passmore (2011) find this market reaction significant in that it showed 
investors questioning the Fed’s commitment to maintaining lower rates in the future; until 
this point, most had left their positions relatively unhedged in their confidence that the 
Fed would maintain a low rate policy for a significant period of time.  
viii. September 23, 2009: QE1 end date is announced  
ix. March 31, 2010: QE1 ends 
 x. August 10, 2010: FOMC announces no further quantitative easing 
FOMC announces they will keep asset holdings at current level; however, they 
will reinvest Agency debt and MBS paydowns into longer-term Treasuries. 
xi. August 23, 2010: Bernanke’s first hint of QE2 (Jackson Hole speech) 
In a time of rising market volatility and policy uncertainty, Bernanke announces 
that the Federal Reserve “will do all that it can” to ensure continued recovery of the U.S. 
economy. In his opening remarks, he states “the committee is prepared to provide 
additional monetary accommodation through unconventional measures if it proves 
necessary, especially if the outlook were to deteriorate significantly.” He voices the view 
that economic growth over the previous year had been far too slow, that unemployment 
had remained far too high, and most importantly that the risk of “undesirable rise in 
inflation” seemed also very low. Most importantly, he states “additional purchases of 
longer-term securities, should the FOMC choose to undertake them, would be effective 
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in further easing financial conditions.” Investors, many of whom already expected further 
stagnant growth and deteriorating market conditions, took Bernanke’s words as a signal 
that the FOMC would likely announce a second round of quantitative easing in the near 
future. 
xii. November 3, 2010: QE2 is formally announced  
The FOMC announces it will purchase an additional $600 billion of longer-term 
Treasury securities by the second quarter of 2011, at a pace of $75 billion per month. The 
committee does this with the intent to facilitate a stronger pace of recovery and to ensure 
inflation remains at levels consistent with the Fed’s mandate, as many committee 
members were beginning to worry about the risk of deflation.  
xiii. November 12, 2010: QE2 purchases begin 
xiv. Late-April 2011: Rates begin sustained drop 
In the aftermath of the tsunami in Japan, which caused a disruption to the global 
economic recovery, weaker U.S. housing and employment data, and a remerging 
sovereign debt crisis that looked poised for contagion, interest rates in the US began a 
sharp and steady decline leading up to the end of QE2. 
xv. June 30, 2011: QE2 ends 
xvi. September 21, 2011: Fed announces “Operation Twist” 
The FOMC announces they will extend the average maturity of the securities on 
its balance sheet by purchasing $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining 
maturities of 6 to 30 years, and selling an equal amount of Treasury securities with 
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remaining maturities of 3 years or less. Although the committee expresses the view that 
they expect the pace of recovery to continue to pick up, they highlight significant 
downside risks to a positive economic outlook and anticipate the unemployment rate to 
remain uncharacteristically high. 
 
6. Results 
a. Inflation Expectations (see Figure 1, 2, 3) 
I used a few types of variables, TIPS breakevens, inflation swap rates, and 
commodities prices in an attempt to find a principal component variable that would 
indicate the effects of policy and macroeconomic events on investors’ inflation 
expectations. In the first analysis, I used the five-year TIPS breakeven and five-year 
inflation swap to indicate investors’ medium-term inflation expectations, and the one-
year inflation swap rate to indicate investors’ short-term expectations. In this analysis, 
the fluctuations of the Z variable, inflation swaps and TIPS breakeven were all consistent 
with my expectations, but each moved at different magnitudes (see figure 1): the Z 
variable for inflation expectations sharply declined after the Lehman crisis (9/15/09), rose 
shortly after QE1 announcement (11/25/08), and rose steadily after QE1 was expanded 
(3/13/09). As expected, the Z variable, as well as each individual inflation-indicating 
asset showed sharp declines when QE1 purchases ended (3/31/10), and began to rise 
again after Bernanke’s infamous Jackson Hole speech (8/23/10), where he indicted a 
willingness to employ a second round of quantitative easing should economic conditions 
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warrant further easing policy. Inflation expectations began to fall around the end of April 
2011, for a number of reasons. The most likely reason was the reemerging sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe, and the rising risk of contagion into Europe’s largest banks, 
governments, and economies. Another likely factor was the increasingly negative 
economic data out of the U.S. that signaled the recovery had less momentum than most 
investors were expecting. QE2 was set to end in June with no further monetary easing 
policies expected, which only added to investor uncertainty at this time. In this analysis, 
the principal component variable, Z, was heavily weighted to the one-year inflation 
swap, the most volatile of the three inflation indicators. This may have skewed the 
results, so I ran a subsequent principal component analysis using only the five-year 
inflation swap and five-year TIPS breakeven.  
In my second inflation expectations principal component analysis, the Z variable, 
as well as the individual inflation indicating variables moved in line with my 
expectations, as they did in the first principal component analysis (see figure 2). One 
interesting difference between the Z variable in the first and second analysis was that that 
in the first analysis, which included the one-year inflation swap, the Z variable did not 
show the expected decline in inflation expectations when QE2 ended on June 30, 2011. 
However, the Z variable that excluded the one-year inflation swap and focused only on 
the 5-year TIPS and 5-year inflation swap showed a significant decline in inflation 
expectations following the end of QE2. This may show divergent expectations between 
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investors that focus on short-term assets, indicated by the one-year inflation rate, versus 
those who invest in medium term assets, indicated by the five-year assets. 
I also looked at a range of commodities data to see whether an artificial variable 
of commodity prices could show price movements based on inflation expectations. 
Interestingly, the Z variable moved in line with my expectations for the most part, while 
the commodities themselves individually varied and did not reflect the expected inflation 
expectations patterns over this time period (see figure 3). Though some volatility was 
evident, the Z variable moved in line with the inflation expectations I had for the 
significant policy event dates: on August 23, 2010, the Z variable began to rise 
significantly, indicating increased inflation expectations. It continued to rise through the 
official QE2 announcement on November 2, 2010 until late-April, in a similar fashion as 
the previous Z variables. However, with the significant increase in gold prices from late-
April until the end of the third quarter of 2011, the Z variable was inconsistent with the 
expectation that inflation expectations should fall at the end of QE2. There were a few 
limitations to this analysis using commodities data as inflation indicators. Commodities 
prices are very volatile, and reflect market pressures other than inflation expectations. 
Gold, for example, was used as a flight-to-safety asset over the summer of 2011, which 
was a period of significant market uncertainty with the increasing intensity of the U.S. 
debt ceiling debate as well as the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Oil prices are also 
indicative of overall economic and production growth; oil prices rise in times of expected 
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growth and fall in times of expected economic contraction or stagnation. However, using 
the covariance’s of these commodities, rather than their individual prices, the artificial Z 
variable moved in line with inflation expectations. With better access to data—the data I 
was able to find was extremely limited—and more individual commodity variables, this 
Z variable for inflation expectations could in fact be useful. 
b. Market Risk (Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) 
To look at the impact of macroeconomic and policy events on investors’ appetite 
for risk, I used a number of different assets to measure various types of risk.  Agency 
MBS securities indicate both prepayment risk and liquidity risk, agency debt indicates 
liquidity risk, and credit default swap indices and corporate bond index tranches indicate 
credit risk. I ran my first market risk principal component analysis using various different 
risk-indicating variables (see figure 4), and then narrowed down by including only one 
variable with each risk category (see figure 5). In figures 4 and 5, both Z variables show 
a number of expected trends: risk premium noticeably rises during the Bear Stearns 
crisis, and peaks on March 14th, the day the of the infamous government bailout, then 
rises substantially again after the Lehman bankruptcy (9/15/2008). The Z variables reach 
a peak around November 25th, the day FOMC announces the first round of asset 
purchases. Risk premiums as evidenced by the Z variables fall slightly shortly after QE1 
is announced, but are still very volatile until QE1 is expanded on March 13, 2009. From 
there, the risk premium Z variable steadily declines to almost the exact date that QE1 
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ended, March 31, 2010. From there, on both graphs it seems the Z variable for risk 
premium is less affected by QE2 announcements and purchases; the overall market risk 
premium remains relatively low until it rises slightly leading up to the end of QE2 and in 
the midst of a pretty rocky summer for the global economy. For my third market risk 
principal component analysis, I substituted the VIX, high-yield, and investment grade 
credit default swap indices for the corporate bond index tranches I used in the previous 
analyses (see figure 6). Credit default swap indices and the corporate bond index tranches 
all reflect different levels of credit risk and they react to significant macroeconomic and 
policy events in a similar pattern but at different magnitudes. The Z variable in figure 6 
reflects the same trend as the previous market risk analyses. However, one interesting 
difference was that when credit default swap indices were used to indicate the default risk 
aspect of the risk premium, the risk premium Z variable exhibited a steeper rise after the 
end of QE2.  This shows a divergence between corporate bonds and credit default swaps 
as indicators of credit risk.  
Finally, I categorized the variables further into their specific risk types. I used a 
number of variables that indicate liquidity risk in one principal component analysis, and a 
number of credit risk variables in another principal component analysis (see figures 7 and 
8). In figure 7, you can see the liquidity risk Z variable rises up to the Bear Stearns 
rescue, and then falls after the firm narrowly dodges bankruptcy. The liquidity risk 
premium rises sharply after the Lehman bankruptcy, which is expected given that the 
bankruptcy caused the commercial paper market to freeze temporarily; this severely 
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disrupted all private credit markets. The Z variable, as well as the other liquidity risk 
variables, all rose from September 15 until the announcement of QE1 on November 25, 
2008.  Following the expansion of QE1 on March 13, 2009, the Z variable fell relatively 
steadily until the end of QE1 in March 2010; the individual variables were extremely 
volatile and did not show any real trend. There are a few issues with this analysis, 
perhaps most importantly that agency MBS prices and spreads are affected by factors 
other than their liquidity premium. They are also affected by prepayment risk and 
housing reform policies, which in recent years have been extremely relevant to mortgage 
refinancing. 
The last market risk principal component analysis I ran was one that focused 
specifically on credit risk; I used credit default swap indices, corporate bond indices, and 
the VIX as individual variables. The Z variable reflected the expected trends, and again 
seemed less affected by the QE2 announcement than by QE1.  However, all individual 
credit risk variables as well as the Z variable rose sharply after QE2 ended in June (see 
figure 8). 
c. Economic Growth  
I also ran two principal component analyses on economic growth expectations 
indicators. In the first, I attempted to use stock market indices, such as the S&P500 and 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and one of the more volatile CMBX tranches to gauge 
the effects of macroeconomic and policy events on investors’ growth expectations. 
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However, the historical CMBX data is extremely limited without an expensive 
subscription, so I could only gauge the results as far back as April 2011. However, in this 
short time period, it is evident that the economic growth Z variable rose significantly 
with the end of QE2 on June 30, 2011, which is the opposite of what I was expecting. 
The Z variable showed considerable decline in the midst of the second Greek bailout 
(7/21/11) and during the political deadlock over the U.S. debt ceiling, which is consistent 
with my expectations. Unfortunately, with such little historical data to analyze, this 
principal component analysis should be evaluated further before drawing any 
conclusions. 
 In my second economic growth principal component analysis, I used the S&P500 
index and S&P500 dividend swaps for 2012 and 2014, which yielded interesting results. 
The Z variable moved very much in line with my expectations. However, there was a 
noticeable divergence in the magnitude of individual asset movements. Both the S&P and 
its dividend swaps moved in near lockstep from the Lehman crisis until about midway 
through QE1.  Interestingly, dividend swap rates began to level off around November 
2009, with the S&P continuing its steady increase. All 3 individual variables, as well as 
the Z variable, rose after Bernanke’s Jackson Hole speech indicating a QE2, however, 
dividend swaps were noticeably less affected than was the S&P index. The S&P fell 
significantly leading up to the end QE2, with dividend swaps again much less affected. 
This divergence between dividend swaps, which are indicative of investors’ consumption 
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growth expectations, and the level of the S&P 500 is evidence that QE2 caused price 
appreciation on more liquid risk assets like the S&P that are frequently traded by fast-
money, speculative investors.   
7. Limitations  
A few important limitations to my study must be noted. As a college student with 
limited resources, I had insufficient access to historical data for some of the more obscure 
securities that I was hoping to use as variables. For example, historical data on certain 
commodities only went back to April 2009, which is in middle of QE1, and data on 
CMBX indices are only freely available starting in April 2011 without a costly 
subscription. Also, significant factors other than monetary policy influence market risk 
appetite, inflation expectations, and economic growth expectations. In this time period, 
for example, two sovereign debt crises occurred in the European Union, the U.S. 
government found itself at a political deadlock with regard to the debt ceiling and deficit 
spending, and U.S. unemployment data, housing data, and other economic indicators 
fluctuated wildly across this time period, which may have caused an endogeneity effect 
in my analysis. Perhaps most significantly, it is extremely hard to gauge when investors 
begin to position themselves for monetary policy actions; in my study I expected 
positioning to occur as policies were announced. However, more levered and fast-money 
investors such as hedge funds speculate prior to the actual announcements and try to 
position early to generate abnormally high returns. 
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8. Conclusion 
 In running a principal component analysis on these measures of market 
expectations, I was looking to gauge the effects of recent unconventional policy actions 
that many believe to be extreme, but were undertaken in an era of unprecedented market 
uncertainty and volatility. Throughout the two periods of quantitative easing, assets were 
affected differently. For example, assets that are generally used to measure inflation 
expectations generally moved in line with what economists would expect; however, the 
individual assets varied in the magnitude that they reflected this expected rise in inflation. 
The same thing occurred with different market risk appetite indicators, as well as 
economic growth indicators. This occurs for a few reasons; the most significant being 
that markets are segmented, and different types of investors may have different 
expectations and will therefore invest differently. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
found a specific case of this in their event study, when they noted that inflation swaps and 
TIPS breakevens reflect similar market expectations but to so at different magnitudes. 
Upon expanding this to other types of market indicators, such as overall market risk 
appetite and economic growth, it seems this divergence among similar assets is common 
due to investors’ diverging expectations and investment decisions. The principal 
component variable, which combined a few individual inflation-indicating variables, 
effectively filters out the idiosyncrasies of each individual asset and acts as a convenient 
way to summarize the effect of these policy actions on different macroeconomic 
expectations more generally.
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